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Conscience and Religion 
Bruce Ryder*
 
While religion has always been a significant force in Canadian pub-
lic life, the relationship between religious and state authority has 
changed profoundly. An explicit or implicit alliance between state 
norms and the teachings of the dominant Christian religions, long taken 
for granted, has been steadily challenged, especially in the last half 
century. The state is now conceived, in popular and constitutional dis-
courses, as officially secular yet supportive of religious pluralism and 
multiculturalism. The path from a de facto Christian state to a secular 
pluralist state is not easily travelled — witness the tortured public de-
bates about replacing the legal definition of marriage derived from 
Christendom with one that better reflects the contemporary objectives of 
state regulation of family relationships. We are still in the early stages of 
trying to work out what it means for the Canadian state to be both offi-
cially secular and supportive of religious pluralism. In this period of 
uneasy transition, the respective roles of secular and religious norms in 




The Supreme Court has had a few opportunities to contribute to these 
debates in recent years.
2
 However, its engagement with the Canadian 
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York Press, 1999); Douglas Farrow, ed., Recognizing Religion in a Secular Society: Essays in 
Pluralism, Religion and Public Policy (Kingston & Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2004); Marguerite Van Die, ed., Religion and Public Life in Canada (Toronto: University of 
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(December 2004). 
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  Most notably in Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36, [2002] S.C.J. No. 87, 
[2002] 4 S.C.R. 710 (school board’s refusal to approve the use of books depicting same-sex parents 
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v. British Columbia College of Teachers, [2001] S.C.J. No. 32, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 (teachers’ college 
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Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”) guarantee of freedom of 
conscience and religion has been limited. In 2004, religious freedom 
issues came to the fore on the Court’s docket, as they have in public 
debates generally. The Court issued three significant rulings on religious 
freedom:
3
 in Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem,
4
 it grappled with the very 
nature of religion and religious belief and issued a ruling requiring ac-
commodation of practices grounded in an individual’s subjectively held 
sincere religious beliefs; in the Same-Sex Marriage Reference,
5
 it con-
cluded that the federal government’s proposed legislative redefinition of 
civil marriage to include same-sex couples posed no threat to freedom 
of religion; and in Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme-
Lafontaine v. Lafontaine (Village),
6
 it considered whether a municipality 
was under an obligation to amend its zoning by-laws to facilitate the 
purchase of land suitable for a place of worship by a congregation of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses.  
I. STATE NEUTRALITY 
Before turning to a discussion of the Court’s three 2004 rulings on 
religious freedom, we will begin by exploring the theme of religious 
neutrality introduced by LeBel J. in Lafontaine. Justice LeBel described 
freedom of religion as imposing “a duty of state neutrality.” The role of 
the state, he wrote, is to act “as an essentially neutral intermediary in 
relations between the various denominations and between those denom-
inations and civil society.”7  
Using conceptions of state neutrality to characterize the obligations 
imposed on governments by constitutional guarantees of freedom of 
religion is commonplace in the United States, although less so in Cana-
da. Neutrality has played a central role in the rich and complex case law 
                                                                                                                                
erred in concluding that a private Christian university’s requirement that students ascribe to reli-
gious beliefs condemning homosexuality was inherently discriminatory). 
3
  Another decision is pending on an appeal from a Quebec ruling holding that freedom of 
religion does not entitle a Sikh student to wear a kirpan in his public school: Multani (tuteur de) c. 
Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2004] J.Q. no. 1904 (Que. C.A.), appeal heard and 
reserved by the Supreme Court of Canada [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 198. 
4
  [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551. 
5
  [2004] S.C.J. No. 75, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698. 
6
  [2004] S.C.J. No. 45, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 650. 
7
  Id., at para. 67. 
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interpreting the First Amendment’s protection of the free exercise of 
religion and its prohibition on the establishment of religion. In Ameri-
can jurisprudence, judges tend to agree on the existence of a state duty 
of religious neutrality, but often disagree about what it means in theory 
and practice. Neutrality, as Harlan J. famously remarked, “is a coat of 
many colors.”8  
While exploring the concept of state neutrality helps capture the es-
sence of legal understandings of religious freedom, it is also an elusive 
concept. Neutrality has no fixed meaning.
9
 Its content is heavily influ-
enced by historical factors and changing cultural contexts. We should 
not expect neutrality to have the same meanings across time or across 
jurisdictions. Because of the breadth and depth of First Amendment 
jurisprudence, American understandings of neutrality loom large in the 
literature. Yet Canadian political traditions, our constitutional text, and 
our jurisprudence differ from the American experience regarding church 
and state. As a result, our understandings of the state’s duty of religious 
neutrality are also different.   
Two different kinds of neutrality dominate discussions in the area of 
religious freedom. One is neutrality between religions, a kind of neutral-
ity required by both the Canadian and American constitutions, although 
Canadian constitutional jurisprudence imposes more expansive positive 
obligations on the state to ensure that its laws or policies do not unduly 
burden the exercise of religious freedoms. The second kind of neutrality 
is neutrality about religion, a kind of neutrality required by the Ameri-
can constitution but not by the Canadian. I will discuss each in turn. 
1.  Neutrality Between Religions 
It is well established in Canadian jurisprudence that the state is sub-
ject to a duty of neutrality between religions. As Dickson C.J. wrote in 
the Big M case, “[t]he protection of one religion and the concomitant 
non-protection of others imports disparate impact destructive of the 
religious freedom of the collectivity.”10 Freedom of religion prohibits 
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  Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, at 249 (1968). 
9
  For a thorough critique of neutrality, see Frank Ravitch, “A Funny Thing Happened on 
the Road to Neutrality: Broad Principles, Formalism and the Establishment Clause” (2004) 38 
Georgia L. Rev. 489. 
10
  R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, at para. 98, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 
337. See also See José Woehrling, “L’obligation d’accommodement raisonnable et l’adaptation de 
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laws or policies that have the purpose or effect of favouring or burden-
ing some religious beliefs or practices over others. The state may not 
require a course of action for the purpose of compelling religious com-
pliance or attempting religious indoctrination.
11
 Rather, respect for free-
dom of religion requires that governments avoid laws or policies that 
seek to enforce the practices of a particular religion or indoctrinate citi-
zens in particular religious beliefs. Thus, for example, the courts have 
held that public institutions cannot engage in religious indoctrination by 
compelling participation in prayers or religious instruction dominated by 
the perspective of a single denomination.
12
 Furthermore, governments 
have a constitutional obligation to adjust laws or policies to remove any 
state-imposed burdens on religious freedom that cannot be reasonably 
and demonstrably justified pursuant to section 1 of the Charter.
13
  
The concept of state neutrality between religions does not exhaust-
ively account for the meanings of freedom of religion. Any law or gov-
ernment policy that imposes a non-trivial burden on the exercise of 
religious or conscientious freedoms will violate section 2(a) of the Char-
ter, whether or not the impact is on the adherents of one belief system or 
many. In other words, section 2(a) can be violated by a law that is neu-
tral in the sense that is equally oppressive of all religions. Nevertheless, 
the state duty of neutrality between religions has been the concern of 





Canadian Civil Liberties Association
16
 all involved laws that had the 
                                                                                                                                
la société à la diversité religieuse” (1998) 43 McGill L.J. 325, at para 96: “… la liberté de religion 
impose une obligation de neutralité à l’État en matière religieuse qui l’empêche de privilégier ou de 
défavoriser une religion par rapport aux autres.” As Woehrling explains, the obligation of neutrality 
is supported by s. 2(a), s. 15 and s. 27 of the Charter: “… l’obligation de neutralité de l’État en 
matière religieuse découle également, outre les articles 2(a) et 15 de la Charte, de l’article 27 sur le 
multiculturalisme. En effet, dans la mesure où la religion fait partie de la culture, le respect du 
multiculturalisme est incompatible avec le fait de favoriser certaines religions par rapport à 
d’autres.” Id., at note 178. 
11
  Big M, id. 
12
  Freitag v. Penetanguishene (Town), [1999] O.J. No. 3524, 179 D.L.R. (4th) 150 (C.A.); 
Canadian Civil Liberties Assn. v. Ontario (Minister of Education), [1990] O.J. No. 104, 65 D.L.R. 
(4th) 1 (C.A.); Russow v. British Columbia (Attorney-General), [1989] B.C.J. No. 611, 62 D.L.R. 
(4th) 98 (B.C.); Manitoba Assn. for Rights and Liberties Inc. v. Manitoba, [1992] M.J. No. 391, 94 
D.L.R. (4th) 678 (Q.B.); Zylberberg v. Sudbury Board of Education (Director), [1988] O.J. No. 
1488, 52 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (C.A.). 
13
  R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713. 
14
  Supra, note 10. 
15
  Supra, note 12. 
16
  Supra, note 12. 
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purpose or effect of compelling observance of Christian teachings or 
practices, and thus violated state neutrality by preferring one religious 
tradition over others. 
The duty of neutrality between religions is firmly established in 
American jurisprudence as well. However, in Smith (1990),
17
 the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that generally applicable laws that are neutral on 
their face do not violate the First Amendment solely because they have 
the incidental effect of burdening religious belief or practice. The Smith 
ruling departed from earlier decisions holding that the First Amendment 
required governments to provide exemptions to laws burdening religious 
beliefs or practices, unless such exemptions would compromise compel-
ling state objectives.
18
 The Canadian courts have held that section 2(a) 
of the Charter can be violated by the indirect effects of facially neutral 
laws. Governments have an obligation to adjust their laws and policies 
to eliminate any unnecessary interference with religious freedom. When 
special measures are put in place by government to accommodate reli-
gious freedoms — for example, providing employees with time for 
religious prayer and observance — the state is giving effect to neutrality 
because without such accommodations facially neutral rules would 
manifestly not be neutral in their impact. The Canadian conception of 
neutrality between religions is thus more expansive and robust com-
pared to its American constitutional counterpart. 
Several common misconceptions about the state’s duty of neutrality 
between religions need to be addressed. Religious neutrality does not 
mean that the state must refuse to take positions on policy disputes that 
have a religious dimension. Many if not most legislative policies will 
accord with some religious beliefs and violate others. Critics who say 
that the state cannot act in a religiously neutral manner in this sense 
have a compelling point.
19
 Secularism, for example, is not neutral. There 
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  Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872 (1990). 
18
  See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); 
Frazee v. Illinois, 489 U.S. 829 (1989). Legislation enacted by Congress in response to Smith has 
restored the legal principles set out in this line of cases. See the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 
42 U.S.C. s. 2000bb (Supp. V 1993). 
19
  See Richard Moon, “Liberty, Neutrality, and Inclusion: Religious Freedom under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2003) 41 Brandeis L.J. 563; David M. Brown, “Free-
dom From or Freedom For? Religion as a Case Study in Defining the Content of Charter Rights” 
(2000) 33 U.B.C. L. Rev. 551; Douglas Farrow, ed., Recognizing Religion in a Secular Society: 
Essays in Pluralism, Religion and Public Policy (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004); Rex 
 
174  Supreme Court Law Review (2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
is no such thing as a view from nowhere. Secular constitutional docu-
ments like the Charter are political expressions of a particular philoso-
phy about religion and life.
20
 But even if we acknowledge that it is not 
coherent to speak of any position as being philosophically or religiously 
neutral, the state remains subject to a duty to avoid laws or policies that 
have the purpose or effect of interfering with the exercise of religious 
freedoms. 
Furthermore, the state’s duty of religious neutrality does not require 
that arguments grounded in religious beliefs must be ignored when 
formulating policy. Religious perspectives have played and should con-
tinue to play an important role in public debates. Ultimately, though, the 
validity of state laws and policies must be determined by reference to 
constitutional norms rather than religious doctrine.
21
  
2. Neutrality About Religion 
Must the state remain neutral about religion generally, that is, neu-
tral as between adherents of religious and conscientious belief systems 
and non-adherents? Or can the state pursue policies that aid religion 
generally, so long as it does so in an even-handed manner that respects 
the duty of neutrality between religions? While there is less case law 
and commentary on this point, Canadian jurisprudence does not impose 
on the state a duty of neutrality about religion. Rather, the Canadian 
position appears to be that the state can aid religion so long as it does so 
                                                                                                                                
Ahdar & Ian Leigh, “Is Establishment Consistent with Religious Freedom?” (2004) 49 McGill L.J. 
635, at para. 102; R. Clouser, The Myth of Religious Neutrality (University of Notre Dame Press, 
1991); Iain T. Benson, “Notes Towards a (Re)definition of the ‘Secular’” (2000) 33 U.B.C. L. Rev. 
519; David N. Cinotti, “The Incoherence of Neutrality: A Case for Eliminating Neutrality from 
Religion Clause Jurisprudence” (2003) 45 J. Church & St. 499. 
20
  Tariq Modood, “Introduction: Establishment, Reform and Multiculturalism” in Tariq 
Modood, ed., Church, State and Religious Minorities (London: Policy Studies Institute, 1997), 3 at 
13. 
21
  See Chamberlain, supra, note 2, per McLachlin C.J.C. at para. 59, commenting on 
whether a school board’s curricular decisions can be influenced by religious views:  
The requirement of secularism … does not preclude decisions motivated in whole or in part 
by religious considerations, provided they are otherwise within the Board’s powers. It simp-
ly signals the need for educational decisions and policies, whatever their motivation, to re-
spect the multiplicity of religious and moral views that are held by families in the school 
community. It follows that the fact that some parents and Board members may have been 
motivated by religious views is of no moment. What matters is whether the Board’s deci-
sion was unreasonable in the context of the educational scheme mandated by the legislature. 
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in a manner that respects the principle of neutrality or even-handedness 
between religions. 
The relationship between religion and state has never been a simple 
one in Canada. The metaphor of an impregnable wall between church 
and state,
22
 so often invoked in the United States, is not a plausible de-
scription of Canadian constitutional traditions. In the introduction to his 
collection of historical documents on the topic, John Moir commented: 
“Canada has rejected the European tradition of church establishment 
without adopting the American ideal of complete separation. Here no 
established church exists, yet neither is there an unscalable wall between 
religion and politics.”23 Writing in 1967, he noted that “Canadians in 
fact assume the presence of an unwritten separation of church and state, 
without denying an essential connection between religious principles 
and national life or the right of the churches to speak out on matters of 
public importance.”24 He characterized this difficult to define relation-
ship as “peculiarly Canadian” and called it “legally disestablished relig-
iosity”: “The tradition of church and state in Canada has grown into a 
peculiar paradox — anti-establishmentarian, but not secularist. Our 
history and our constitution require that the state be neither indifferent 
to nor involved in the church, and vice-versa.”25  
Moir’s account needs to be updated, since Canadians’ attitudes to 
church and state have evolved a great deal since 1967. The state is more 
resolutely secularist now, and the place of explicit reliance on religion in 
public debates is much more contested. The paradox Moir described has 
been reshaped in the Charter era, in part by the increasing multicultural-
ism and religious pluralism that characterizes Canadian society, and in 
part by the impact of the Charter itself. The Charter is, in many im-
portant ways, the nation’s new secular religion, establishing the funda-
mental norms with which all laws and public policies must comply. 
The Charter may appear to embody a paradox similar to the one 
Moir described. Moir spoke of a “legally disestablished religiosity” 
characterizing Canadian political culture, one that has evolved, in 
                                                                                                                                
22
  E.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
23
  John S. Moir, Church and State in Canada, 1627-1867 (Toronto: McClelland and Stew-
art, 1967), at xiii. 
24
  Id.  
25
  Id., at xix. 
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George Egerton’s expression, into a “religiously-positive pluralism.”26 
The preamble of the Charter announces that Canada is a nation 
“founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the 
rule of law.” Sections 2(a) and 15 guarantee religious freedom and 
religious equality, respectively. Section 27 directs that the Charter be 
interpreted so as to preserve and enhance Canada’s multicultural herit-
age, and section 29 protects existing denominational school rights. 
How are we to make sense of this jumble of apparently paradoxical 
provisions?
27
 Is it possible to simultaneously affirm both sacred and 
secular sources of authority? To integrate the nation’s historical roots 
and its future aspirations? 
Given the surprisingly strong interpretive weight the Supreme Court 
has given to the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867,
28
 and to the 
reference to the rule of law in the Charter’s preamble,29 it may be only a 
matter of time before the courts cease to view the preamble as “an em-
barrassment to be ignored,”30 and embrace it as an interpretive oppor-
tunity thus far missed.
31
 The supremacy of God clause is perhaps best 
understood as a reminder of the state’s role in not just respecting the 
autonomy of faith communities, but also in nurturing and supporting 
them, as long as it does so in an even-handed manner.
32
 
                                                                                                                                
26
  George Egerton, “Writing the Canadian Bill of Rights: Religion, Politics and the Chal-
lenge of Pluralism 1957-1960” (2004) 19 C.J.L.S. 1, at 19. 
27
  William Klassen sees the preamble and the Charter’s guarantee of religious freedom as 
“a contradiction which even a theologian, to say nothing of all the lawyers, must surely recognize”: 
“Religion and the Nation: An Ambiguous Alliance” (1991) 40 U.N.B.L.J. 87 at 95. 
28
  See Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Is-
land, [1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 per Lamer C.J.C., describing the preamble to the 
1867 Act as the “grand entrance hall to the castle of the Constitution” (at para. 109).  
29
  See Reference re: Manitoba Language Rights (Man), [1985] S.C.J. No. 36, [1985] 1 
S.C.R. 721; Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. 
30
  Brown, supra, note 19, at para. 20. 
31
  In this regard, see Lorne Sossin’s ambitious attempt to vitalize the preamble as “a repos-
itory of the tenets of our moral system and commitments to social justice”: “The ‘Supremacy of 
God’, Human Dignity and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2003) 52 U.N.B.L.J. 227, at 237. 
See also George Egerton, “Trudeau, God, and the Canadian Constitution: Religion, Human Rights 
and Government Authority in the Making of the 1982 Constitution,” in Lyon & Van Die, eds., 
supra, note 1. 
32
  For example, regarding the public funding of private religious schools,  José Woehrling 
writes that “le principe de neutralité religieuse découlant de la liberté de conscience et de religion 
n’interdirait pas à l’État de les aider financièrement, à condition qu’il le fasse sans privilégier ni 
défavoriser aucune religion par rapport aux autres.” Supra, note 10, at para. 104. 
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The preamble represents a kind of secular humility, a recognition 
that there are other truths, other sources of competing world-views, of 
normative and authoritative communities that are profound sources of 
meaning in people’s lives that ought to be nurtured as counter-balances 
to state authority. 
The preamble’s references to the “supremacy of God” and the “rule 
of law” express a form of reconciliation between the secular nature of 
the state and the importance of protecting religious belief and practice. 
They underline the fact that the state is secular and must be neutral be-
tween religions, but that it should also nurture and protect religious 
expression. In this way, there is a complementarity, not a conflict, in the 
preamble’s reference to the “supremacy of God,” the Charter’s guaran-
tees of religious freedom and equality, and the promotion of multicul-
turalism. The text of the Charter as a whole suggests that the Canadian 
state should aim to secure a religiously positive pluralism in an even-
handed manner.
33
 This is best accomplished by a secular state that is 
neutral between religions but not neutral about religion.
34
 
In contrast, in the United States a much stricter wall separates secu-
lar and religious authorities. The Canadian Constitution lacks an equiva-
lent of the First Amendment’s anti-establishment clause. The American 
Constitution has no equivalent of the Canadian Charter’s “supremacy of 
God” preamble. A majority of the U.S. Supreme Court is committed to 
                                                                                                                                
33
  For example, if public schools choose to be involved in religious education, or if public 
institutions observe religious practices, they must do so in an even-handed manner that avoids 
indoctrination and respects a plurality of religious and conscientious beliefs. See Zylberberg, supra, 
note 12. 
34
  The content of the Canadian state’s obligations of religious neutrality presented here 
shares much common ground, if not the eloquence, of Justice Albie Sachs description of the South 
African position:  
South Africa is an open and democratic society with a non-sectarian state that guarantees 
freedom of worship; is respectful of and accommodatory towards, rather than hostile to or 
walled-off from, religion; acknowledges the multi-faith and multi-belief nature of the coun-
try; does not favour one religious creed or doctrinal truth above another; accepts the intense-
ly personal nature of individual conscience and affirms the intrinsically voluntary and non-
coerced character of belief; respects the rights of non-believers; and does not impose ortho-
doxies of thought or require conformity of conduct in terms of any particular world-view. 
The Constitution, then, is very much about the acknowledgement by the state of different 
belief systems and their accommodation within a non-hierarchical framework of equality 
and non-discrimination. It follows that the state does not take sides on questions of religion. 
It does not impose belief, grant privileges to or impose disadvantages on adherents of any 
particular belief, require conformity in matters simply of belief, involve itself in purely reli-
gious controversies, or marginalise people who have different beliefs. 
S. v. Lawrence, 1997 (4) SA 1176, at para. 148. 
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the view that the First Amendment mandates both kinds of governmen-
tal neutrality — “between religion and religion, and between religion 
and non-religion.”35 Canadian law is even more strongly committed to 
the first kind of state neutrality, neutrality between religions. But on the 
second type of neutrality, ours is a different tradition, one that supports 
and encourages even-handed state support of religious and conscientious 
freedoms.  
The difference between Canadian and American approaches to the 
issue of state neutrality about religion is perhaps most evident in contro-
versies regarding public funding of religious schools. In the United 
States, government programs providing direct financial aid to religious 
schools — even if made available in an even-handed manner to all de-
nominations — are prohibited as a violation of the principle of neutrali-
ty flowing from the establishment clause of the First Amendment.
36
 In 
Canada, on the other hand, the issue has not been whether governments 
are permitted to provide direct financial aid to religious schools; the 
question has been whether the Charter requires further government 
funding of religious schools beyond those already enjoying constitution-
ally entrenched denominational school rights. In the Adler case, a major-
ity of the Supreme Court of Canada held that the Charter creates no 
constitutional obligation to fund religious schools. None of the judg-
ments in the case suggested there was any constitutional impediment to 
the extension of state funding to religious schools. To the contrary, in 
the principal majority opinion, Iacobucci J. wrote that the provinces are 
free to extend funding to religious schools if they so choose.
37
 Similarly, 
in her dissenting opinion, L’Heureux-Dubé J. wrote that public funding 
would “promote the value of religious tolerance in this context where 
                                                                                                                                
35
  Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, at 104 (1968). See also Everson, supra, note 22, per 
Black J. (“Neither a state nor the Federal Government … can pass laws which aid one religion, aid 
all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”); McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties 
Union, 2005 U.S. Lexis 5211, per Souter J. for the majority. 
36
  E.g., Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 
(1973) (tuition tax credits for parents of children in private religious schools declared unconstitu-
tional). The Court has upheld forms of aid that are made available neutrally to parents of children at 
any school, religious or not: Mueller v. Allen, 421 U.S. 349 (1983); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 
U.S. 639 (2002). For excellent discussions of the complexity of the American jurisprudence on 
religious neutrality, see Douglas Laycock, “The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality” 
(1997) 46 Emory L.J. 43; Douglas Laycock, “Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality 
Toward Religion” (1990) 39 DePaul L. Rev. 993.  
37
  Adler v. Ontario, [1996] S.C.J. No. 110, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609, at para. 48. 
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some religious communities cannot be accommodated in the secular 
system.”38 
(a)  Religious Neutrality and Positive State Obligations: Lafontaine 
The discussion of religious neutrality above led to the conclusion 
that Canadian governments must remain neutral between religions but 
need not be neutral about religion. They may extend support to religion 
so long as they do so in an even-handed manner. What about positive 
obligations? To what extent must the state take positive steps to facili-
tate the exercise of religious freedom? In Big M
39
 and Edwards Books
40
 
the Court understood freedom of religion, like the other fundamental 
freedoms, as imposing primarily negative obligations on the state to 
avoid adopting policies that would impose coercive pressure on individ-
uals. However, the Court recognized that a purely negative conception 
of freedom of religion would be incomplete. Section 2(a) imposes a mix 
of positive and negative obligations on the state. The state has positive 
obligations to adjust laws or policies that have the effect of imposing 
burdens on religious belief and practice. Ostensibly neutral rules are not 
necessarily neutral in their impact on religion. Thus, to cite a few well-
known examples, if they can do so without undue hardship, employers 
must adjust workplace rules to permit employees to engage in religious 
observance
41
 and governments must design and implement sabbatarian 
exemptions to Sunday closing laws to alleviate the financial burden 
placed on retailers who observe a Sabbath other than Sunday.
42
 
In the absence of state-imposed burdens on religious freedom, the 
courts have not interpreted section 2(a) as imposing positive obligations 
on governments to facilitate the exercise of religious freedoms. “Never,” 
wrote McLachlin J. (as she then was) in the Adler case, “has it been 
suggested that freedom of religion entitles one to state support for one’s 
religion.”43 Thus, for example, the existing jurisprudence would likely 
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require governments to adjust their employment policies to accommo-
date, up to the point of undue hardship, the religious needs of public 
sector employees by making time and space available for prayer or 
meditation; it does not require governments to pass laws requiring pri-
vate sector employers to do the same.  
While the Charter does not impose obligations on governments to 
support religion, it permits and arguably encourages such support. Pro-
vincial governments may make public funding available to private reli-
gious schools, so long as they do so in an even-handed manner.
44
 The 
Ontario Court of Appeal has held that pluralist religious instruction is 
permissible in public schools so long as it falls short of religious indoc-
trination.
45
 The state must avoid imposing burdens on religious free-
doms, and it may choose to be supportive and facilitative of all religious 
observance, so long as it can do so, as a practical matter, in an even-
handed manner. 
The nature of governments’ positive obligations, and their relation-
ship to duties of religious neutrality, were raised before the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme-
Lafontaine v. Lafontaine (Village).
46
 A congregation of Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses felt they were unable to locate a suitable piece of land on which 
to build a place of worship, a Kingdom Hall, within the area zoned for 
this purpose by the village of Lafontaine’s by-laws. Whether suitable 
land was truly unavailable was a crucial and disputed issue throughout 
the litigation that ensued. The Congregation had been looking for land 
on which to build a Kingdom Hall since 1989 and had been seeking 
permission from the municipality to build such a facility since 1992. 
Each time the Congregation located suitable parcels of land elsewhere, 
the Congregation was unsuccessful in its attempts to persuade the vil-
lage to amend its zoning by-laws. On the third occasion the municipality 
refused to amend its by-laws, it stated, in a 1993 letter, that it need not 
explain why: 
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The municipal council of Lafontaine is not required to provide you 
with a justification and we therefore have no intention of giving 
reasons for the council’s decision.
47
 
As McLachlin C.J. later noted, this letter “effectively foreclosed any 
possibility that the Municipality would assist the Congregation in its 
quest for land upon which to build its place of worship.”48 The Congre-
gation then initiated an action alleging that the municipality’s refusal to 
amend its zoning by-law violated its freedom of religion.  
At the Quebec Superior Court, the trial judge, Dubois J., found that 
suitable land was still available for purchase within the area where the 
zoning by-law permitted the construction of places of worship. He 
found that the by-law did not infringe freedom of religion.  
On appeal, the Quebec Court of Appeal was unanimous in finding 
that the trial judge had made an unreasonable error in his assessment of 
the facts. The Court of Appeal was of the view that, practically speak-
ing, no suitable land was available in the area zoned for places of wor-
ship. The Court of Appeal divided on the significance of this fact.  
The majority, Gendreau and Pelletier JJ.A., held that the Munici-
pality was not responsible for the unavailability of land and had no 
positive obligation to facilitate freedom of religion. The source of the 
problem was the unwillingness of private landowners to sell their prop-
erty. The Municipality was under no duty to ensure that every religious 
community could have a place of worship located within its boundaries. 
Chief Justice Robert dissenting, held that the zoning by-law in-
fringed freedom of religion as it made it impossible for the appellants to 
build a place of worship. The Municipality was therefore under a duty to 
make a reasonable effort to accommodate the appellants by amending its 
zoning by-law to permit the construction of a place of worship in anoth-
er area. 
The Supreme Court of Canada, in a 5-4 ruling, allowed the appeal. 
The majority opinion, written by McLachlin C.J.,
49
 was based exclusive-
ly on administrative law grounds. Unlike the Quebec Court of Appeal, 
the majority accepted the trial judge’s finding that land was available 
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where a Kingdom Hall could be built.
50
 This finding undercut the factu-
al basis of the religious freedom argument.  The majority, in declining to 
address whether the zoning by-law or actions of the Municipality violat-
ed religious freedom, likely believed that a useful discussion of the 
constitutional obligations of municipalities in this area should await a 
more favourable factual foundation. Nevertheless, given that the Con-
gregation and a number of interveners had focused their arguments on 
the religious freedom issues, the majority’s refusal to even consider 
them is somewhat surprising.  
Instead of engaging the constitutional issues, the majority held that 
the Municipality violated its duty of procedural fairness owed to the 
Congregation by refusing to provide reasons to justify its decisions to 
deny two of the applications for rezoning. In considering the scope of 
the duty of procedural fairness owed to the Congregation, McLachlin 
C.J.C. noted that the Municipality needed to consider that its “decision 
affects the Congregation’s practice of its religion. The right to freely 
adhere to a faith and to congregate with others in doing so is of primary 
importance.”51 In the result, the majority remitted the rezoning applica-
tion to the Municipality for reconsideration.  
The majority judges were apparently not troubled by the weakness 
of the remedy they ordered. The Chief Justice acknowledged that the 
result could be that the Municipality would simply refuse further appli-
cations for rezoning, accompanying its refusal this time with proper 
reasons.
52
 If this was to occur, and the Congregation was unable to pur-
chase land in the zone permitted for places of worship — a possible 
result given the futility of their search prior to the litigation — would 
religious freedom then be violated? The majority opinion is silent on 
this question, compelling the Congregation to re-litigate the issue if this 
sequence of events were to unfold. The majority thus chose a path that 
offered the Congregation little support in its struggle with a municipality 
that was apparently indifferent to its religious needs. The majority’s 
failure to offer reasons for not addressing the religious freedom argu-
ment, apart from noting that it was “unnecessary” to do so,53 must have 
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struck the Congregation as no more sympathetic to its plight than the 
Municipality had been. 
Justice LeBel’s dissent,54 even though it offered the Congregation 
no immediate remedy, was more supportive of the Congregation’s reli-
gious freedom than the majority. In a lengthy obiter dicta, LeBel J. 
indicated that the Municipality would be under a constitutional obliga-
tion to amend its zoning by-law if it turns out that no land is available to 
the Congregation in the zone where places of worship are currently 
permitted. Justice LeBel’s opinion is notable for his scholarly discussion 
of the duty of religious neutrality and its impact on the question of when 
governments can take, or must take, positive steps to support religious 
freedom. His opinion provides useful future guidance to the village of 
Lafontaine, and to other governments facing similar circumstances, on 
the nature of their constitutional obligations to facilitate religious wor-
ship.  
Justice LeBel would have denied any relief to the Congregation for 
two reasons. First, even though he agreed with the majority’s finding 
that the municipality had denied procedural fairness to the Congregation 
by failing to provide sufficient reasons for its refusal to amend its zon-
ing by-laws,
55
 he held that the Court could not base its decision on this 
ground since the Congregation declined to rely on it at the hearing be-
fore the Court.
56
 Second, he accepted the trial judge’s finding that land 
was available for purchase in the zone where places of worship could be 
located and that, as a result, the Congregation’s freedom of religion had 
not been violated by the by-laws or the Municipality’s failure to amend 
them.
57
 The Congregation had failed to demonstrate that the purpose or 




Before reaching his conclusion on the religious freedom issue, 
LeBel J. undertook a discussion of the duty of religious neutrality im-
posed on governments by section 2(a) of the Charter. Drawing on Pro-
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fessor Woehrling’s leading article on religious freedom,59 LeBel J.’s 
discussion was in part a restatement of the well-established principle of 
neutrality between religions. As he wrote,  
… the state acts as an essentially neutral intermediary in relations 
between the various denominations and between those denominations 
and civil society … it is no longer the state’s place to give active 
support to any one particular religion, if only to avoid interfering in 
the religious practices of the religion’s members. The state must 
respect a variety of faiths whose values are not easily reconciled.
60
 
The more innovative and controversial aspects of LeBel J.’s opinion 
suggest that the duty of religious neutrality goes beyond a duty of even-
handedness as between religions. He argued that the state must also 
remain neutral about the value of religion generally. He linked this idea 
to the evolving “dissociation of the functions of church and state.”61 The 
resulting “clear distinction between churches and public authorities,”62 
in his view, requires the state to “be neutral in matters of religion.”63  
Conceiving the Municipality’s duty of religious neutrality as em-
bracing a duty of neutrality regarding the value of religious worship 
itself, LeBel J. reached the following conclusion about the Municipali-
ty’s obligations: 
As the municipality is required to be neutral in matters of religion, its 
by-laws must be structured in such a way as to avoid placing 
unnecessary obstacles in the way of the exercise of religious freedoms. 
However, it does not have to provide assistance of any kind to 
religious groups or actively help them resolve any difficulties they 
might encounter in their negotiations with third parties in relation to 
plans to establish a place of worship.  In the case at bar, the 
municipality did not have to provide the appellants with access to a lot 
that corresponded better to their selection criteria. Such assistance 
would be incompatible with the municipality’s duty of neutrality in 
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that the municipality would be manipulating its regulatory standards in 
favour of a particular religion. Such support for a religious group 
could jeopardize the neutrality the municipality must adopt toward all 
such groups.
64
   
Justice LeBel’s comments appear to be taking the conception of re-
ligious neutrality in a direction more consonant with American constitu-
tional traditions. Canadian jurisprudence has not insisted on a “wall of 
separation” between church and state, nor on a principle of state non-
involvement in matters religious. To the contrary, our jurisprudence 
places a positive value on the protection and promotion of religious 
pluralism. As discussed above, the preamble to the Charter, by affirming 
that Canada “is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of 
God” — when read in conjunction with the Charter’s commitments to 
religious freedom, religious equality and multiculturalism — suggests 
that the Charter should be interpreted in a manner that permits the state 
to foster a religiously-positive pluralism. The state may nourish reli-
gious expression and foster the vitality of religious communities, so 
long as it does so in an even-handed manner. Freedom of religion 
should not be interpreted as imposing a duty on the state to refrain from 
even-handed religious support.  
From this perspective, while LeBel J. was right to insist that the 
Municipality was under no obligation to assist the Congregation in find-
ing better lots than the ones already available for sale, he was on less 
solid ground in suggesting that the Municipality could not choose to 
offer such assistance. So long as the Municipality could offer such assis-
tance on an even-handed basis to any denomination seeking to construct 
a place of worship, no duty of religious neutrality would be violated. 
Justice LeBel went on to consider, in obiter dicta, whether freedom 
of religion would be violated if the Congregation had demonstrated an 
absence of suitable land available in the area zoned for places of wor-
ship. He found that a violation would have occurred. “The construction 
of a place of worship,” he noted, “is an integral part of the freedom of 
religion protected by s. 2(a) of the Charter.”65 Contrary to the conclu-
sions of the majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal, the unavailability 
of a location where a place of worship could be constructed would not 
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be the sole responsibility of private landowners. The Municipality 
would bear responsibility as well for its refusal to adapt the zoning by-
law to evolving community needs. Thus, wrote LeBel J., the hypothet-
ical situation where no property is available 
… involves one such exceptional situation in which a posture of 
restraint on the municipality’s part would interfere with the appellants’ 
freedom of religion. It would be utterly impossible for the appellants 
to establish their place of worship within the boundaries of the 
municipality if no land were available in the only zone where this type 
of use is authorized. As it would then be impossible to practise their 
religion, this would constitute direct interference with their freedom of 
religion. This is a clear example of a case in which freedom of religion 
can have no real meaning unless the public authorities take positive 
action. Since such positive action would be required, it would 
constitute a reasonable limit on the principle of state neutrality.
66
 
Justice LeBel’s conclusion that, in these circumstances, the Munici-
pality would be under a positive constitutional obligation to amend its 
zoning by-laws is compelling. However, his suggestion that the result 
would be in conflict with (“a reasonable limit on”) the principle of state 
neutrality is puzzling. In a passage quoted by LeBel J., Professor 
Woehrling takes the same view: 
… les deux principes constitutifs de la liberté de religion — libre 
exercice et neutralité de l’État — doivent être considérés comme 
mutuellement limitatifs, puisque le fait de donner une amplitude 
maximale à l’un entraînerait fatalement la négation de l’autre. 
L’obligation de neutralité de l’État en matière religieuse doit être 
limitée par l’obligation d’accommodement, laquelle justifie certaines 
formes d’assistance étatique aux religions.
67
  
The potential conflict posited by LeBel J. and Professor Woehrling 
arises only if one conceives of religious neutrality as requiring a strict 
separation between church and state. Yet, as discussed above, the Cana-
dian constitutional position differs from the American in two crucial 
respects. First, Canadian jurisprudence imposes an obligation on govern-
ments to adjust facially-neutral laws and policies to remove unnecessary 
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burdens on religious freedom. Second, Canadian jurisprudence con-
ceives of neutrality as permitting even-handed state promotion of reli-
gion. The state’s duty of neutrality between religions, in Canadian law, 
does not require state neutrality about religion. It permits the state to 
promote, in an even-handed manner, a religiously-positive pluralism.  
In contrast to American constitutional law, then, no conflict arises in 
Canadian constitutional law between state neutrality and positive duties 
of accommodation. Rather, in order to remove burdens on religious 
freedom resulting from state policies, and to give effect to the principle 
of state neutrality between religions, positive state action is required. As 
Dickson C.J. put it in Big M, “[t]he equality necessary to support reli-
gious freedom does not require identical treatment of all religions. In 
fact the interests of true equality may well require differentiation in 
treatment.”68  
(b)  Separating “Christendom” and State: The Same-Sex Marriage 
Reference 
If zoning laws seem an unlikely context in which issues related to 
state duties of religious neutrality might arise, the same cannot be said 
of marriage law, which for centuries has been the site of struggles over 
the boundaries of religious and state authority. The Same-Sex Marriage 
Reference
69
 raised the issue of whether freedom of religion hinders the 
ability of Parliament to redefine civil marriage to include same-sex 
couples. 
References to the Supreme Court ought to be initiated by the federal 
government where advice is needed to clarify uncertain legal issues. In 
practice, however, references are often used for political purposes. The 
Same-Sex Marriage Reference was a classic example of a politically 
motivated use of the reference procedure. The government presented to 
the Court a Proposed Act that would define civil marriage as the union 
of two persons to the exclusion of all others, thus confirming the legality 
of same-sex marriage across the country. At the time the reference was 
initiated, court rulings in British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec had left 
little doubt that the federal government could pass such legislation and 
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that, indeed, such a change in the law was required to give effect to the 
equality rights of same-sex couples.
70
 The federal government’s deci-
sion to refer the Proposed Act to the Supreme Court appeared to be 
motivated by a desire to buy further time to enable the public to get used 
to the idea of same-sex marriage and to enlist the Supreme Court’s mor-
al authority in supporting the legislation. 
The public debate about same-sex marriage has been characterized 
by confusion regarding the respective roles of church and state. This is 
perhaps not surprising since the legal definition of marriage has long 
been aligned with dominant religious understandings, and since most 
marriages in Canada are performed in a religious context. No doubt the 
federal government hoped that the Supreme Court’s opinion in the ref-
erence would help educate the public on the differences between reli-
gious and civil marriage and appease concerns that legalizing same-sex 
marriage threatened religious freedom.  
From the point of view of civic education on the respective roles of 
church and state, the opinion issued by the Court in the Same-Sex Mar-
riage Reference both succeeds and disappoints. The Court’s answers 
were clear, yet terse. The Court seemed to adopt a minimalist approach: 
say as little as possible and send the issues back to the politicians where 
they belong. This was in sharp contrast to the Court’s approach in an-
other recent reference, the Secession Reference,
71
 which also raised 
questions on which there was little legal doubt yet a great deal of politi-
cal confusion. In the Secession Reference, the Court crafted a lengthy 
opinion that reads like a civics lesson, situating its answers in a careful 
historical review of fundamental constitutional principles. The Court 
clearly saw itself performing an important role in statecraft. Not so in 
the Same-Sex Marriage Reference. The Court’s opinion is uncluttered 
by historical embellishments, normative discursions or detailed analysis 
of any kind.  
Nevertheless, the Court did make clear that the Proposed Act was 
within the constitutional competence of Parliament, and that it would be 
consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In  
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particular, the Court decisively rejected arguments that the Proposed Act 
would violate freedom of religion. 
The common law, according to the leading 1866 English ruling in 
Hyde v. Hyde, defines marriage, “as understood in Christendom,” “as 
the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the exclu-
sion of all others.”72 After quoting this definition, the Court remarked 
pointedly: 
 The reference to “Christendom” is telling. Hyde spoke to a society 
of shared social values where marriage and religion were thought to be 
inseparable. This is no longer the case. Canada is a pluralistic society. 
Marriage, from the perspective of the state, is a civil institution.
73
 
If the common law definition flows from a Christian conception of mar-
riage, the definition of marriage in the Proposed Act, the Court pointed 
out, has a different kind of source. “Far from violating the Charter,” the 
Court wrote, the Proposed Act “flows from it.”74 The historical shift 
from religious to secular constitutional norms as a source of political 
authority could not be more poignantly demonstrated. 
State obligations of religious neutrality, while not explicitly dis-
cussed by the Court, cast doubt on the constitutional validity of the 
common law definition of marriage, rather than on the definition in the 
Proposed Act. Religious neutrality does not mean that the state must 
avoid taking sides on matters of religious disagreement. Neutrality in 
this sense is not possible unless the state refrains from regulating mar-
riage, divorce and a host of other matters. Rather, religious neutrality, as 
understood in Charter jurisprudence, requires the state to not take a 
position for the purpose of favouring one religious view over another 
and to avoid adopting laws or policies that have the effect of burdening 
religious freedom. Since the common law definition was explicitly fash-
ioned to implement Christian views, it is the common law definition that 
is problematic from the point of view of state duties of religious neutral-
ity. Since the definition in the Proposed Act was designed to achieve 
Charter compliance, it is not problematic from the point of view of state 
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neutrality unless it would have the effect of interfering with religious 
freedom. 
The Court went on to summarily dispense with the arguments that 
the Proposed Act would have the effect of violating religious freedom. 
First, the Court considered the argument that the Proposed Act would 
impose a dominant social ethos that would limit the freedom to hold 
religious beliefs to the contrary. To this the Court responded with a 
single proposition: “the mere recognition of the equality rights of one 
group cannot, in itself, constitute a violation of the rights of another.”75 
This was not a satisfying response. Rights can conflict. More to the 
point here is that the Proposed Act does not interfere with the freedom 
to hold contrary beliefs. Freedom of religion does not entail a right to 
have legal norms aligned with one’s religious beliefs. The argument 
misconstrues religious freedom with religious imposition. 
Second, the Court rejected the argument that the passage of the 
Proposed Act would violate the Charter because it would lead to a colli-
sion between the rights of same-sex couples and the religious freedom 
of those opposed to same-sex marriage. The Court responded by ac-
knowledging the possibility of such collisions occurring in the future, 
and by saying, in essence, that the Court would balance competing 
rights, as it has in other cases.
76
 
Finally, the Court stated that section 2(a) would protect religious of-
ficials in the unlikely event that the state at some future date might seek 
to compel them to perform same-sex marriages contrary to their reli-
gious beliefs. Freedom of religion protects religious practice, and “[t]he 
performance of religious rites is a fundamental aspect of religious prac-
tice.”77 State interference with religious rites would constitute a severe 
violation of religious freedom. But the Court went beyond this obvious 
conclusion. It also stated that section 2(a) would protect religious officials 
from being compelled by the state to perform civil same-sex marriages 
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that are contrary to their religious beliefs.
78
 The Court offered no reason-
ing in support of this more controversial conclusion.  
A civil marriage is not a religious rite. If a religious official is li-
censed to perform civil marriages, he or she is delivering a public ser-
vice in a secular context on behalf of the state. He or she is acting as a 
public official, not a religious official, and thus is bound to comply with 
Charter equality rights. Same-sex couples have no right of access to a 
marriage ceremony in a religious context, but they do have a right of 
equal access to all public services, including civil marriage. The appro-
priate balance between a public official’s religious or conscientious 
objection to performing civil same-sex marriages and a same-sex cou-
ple’s equal right to a civil marriage ought not to tilt automatically in one 
direction or the other.  
In the wake of court rulings legalizing civil same-sex marriage, 
some provincial governments have reportedly directed their marriage 
commissioners to be prepared to perform civil same-sex marriages or 
resign. If governments do not provide an exemption from performing 
same-sex marriages to religious objectors, such a directive would consti-
tute religious discrimination in employment contrary to the Charter and 
applicable provincial human rights legislation. Human rights jurispru-
dence supports the rights of employees, whether in the public or the 
private sector, whether or not they are religious officials, to object to the 
performance of job duties on religious grounds, and employers have an 
obligation to accommodate them if they can do so without undue hard-
ship. Thus, for example, a tribunal has held that a public sector employ-
ee who objected to abortion on religious grounds could not be 
compelled to process a claim for abortion-related benefits, since the 
government failed to demonstrate efforts to accommodate her beliefs up 
to the point of undue hardship.
79
 
Thus, whether a public official is entitled to a religious or conscien-
tious objection from being compelled to perform civil same-sex mar-
riages depends on whether the official’s beliefs could be accommodated 
without undue hardship — in particular, without compromising a same-sex 
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couple’s equal access to civil marriage. Most of the time, governments 
should have little difficulty respecting both religious freedom and equal 
access to civil marriage, since other public officials will be available and 
willing to marry same-sex couples. If this is not the case, however, it 
may be a reasonable limit on a public official’s religious freedom to 
require him or her to perform a civil same-sex marriage ceremony. In 
the absence of a factual context, it is not possible to resolve the collision 
of rights that may arise when a public official licensed to perform mar-
riages refuses to perform same-sex marriages on religious grounds. 
(c)  Defining Conscientious and Religious Belief: Amselem 
Since the state has a duty to adjust laws or policies to eliminate 
state-imposed burdens on the exercise of religious freedoms, including 
practices grounded in religious beliefs, a series of questions with crucial 
legal significance arise about the nature of religious belief. How do we 
go about determining what practices qualify as grounded in religious 
beliefs? What is a religion? Who determines the scope of religious be-
lief? These questions have bedevilled religious studies and legal theory 




As if the question of defining religion was not hard enough, section 
2(a) of the Charter protects “freedom of conscience and religion.” Dis-
cussions of section 2(a) commonly omit reference to freedom of con-
science, using “freedom of religion” as a shorthand way of describing 
what are in fact two closely related yet distinct fundamental freedoms. 
This tendency should not lead us to lose sight of the importance of free-
dom of conscience, or erase it from section 2(a), or collapse it into free-
dom of religion. The reference to conscience must add something to 
section 2(a); it must lead to constitutional protection of some non-
religious belief systems.  
An example of the recognition of the independent significance of 
freedom of conscience in protecting practices grounded in non-religious 
belief systems is the case of Maurice v. Canada (Attorney General).
81
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The claimant, a federal inmate, had received a vegetarian diet on reli-
gious grounds until he renounced his Hare Krishna faith. Thereafter, 
Correctional Services Canada (“CSC”) refused to provide him with a 
vegetarian diet even though he insisted on it as a matter of moral con-
science. Justice Campbell found that his freedom of conscience had 
been violated:  
… while the CSC has recognized its legal duty to facilitate the 
religious freedoms outlined in the Charter, freedom of conscience has 
been effectively ignored. Section 2(a) of the Charter affords the 
fundamental freedom of both religion and conscience, yet by the 
CSC’s policy, inmates with conscientiously held beliefs may be denied 
expression of their “conscience.” In my opinion the CSC’s approach is 
inconsistent. The CSC cannot incorporate s. 2(a) of the Charter in a 
piecemeal manner; both freedoms are to be recognized.
82
 
In other words, even if a practice is grounded in a belief that does 
not qualify as religious, it may still be protected by section 2(a) if the 
belief is a conscientious one. Justice Campbell in Maurice was satisfied 
that vegetarianism, as a dietary choice founded on the belief that the 
consumption of animals is morally wrong, is a belief system that quali-
fied as conscientious in that case.
83
  
When do beliefs become matters of conscience for constitutional 
purposes? Not all beliefs or opinions can qualify as matters of con-
science; otherwise, freedom of conscience would become the freedom to 
disregard all laws with which we disagree. As a Scottish court stated 
when a fox-hunter challenged a law prohibiting hunting animals with 
dogs, freedom of conscience cannot “give individuals a right to perform 
any acts in pursuance of whatever beliefs they may hold.”84 Yet the 
spectre of anarchy should not be invoked to deny protection entirely to 
practices grounded in non-religious conscience. Freedom of conscience, 
for the purposes of section 2(a), ought to embrace comprehensive non-
religious belief systems that have the kinds of significance in the lives of 
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Clearly, courts interpreting section 2(a) face significant challenges 
in defining the scope and nature of religious and non-religious conscien-
tious belief systems. Until last year, the Supreme Court had managed to 
avoid the issue in its Charter rulings. In Syndicat Northcrest v. 
Amselem,
86
 members of the Court engaged in a fascinating debate about 
the nature of religious belief. The issue was whether the religious free-
dom of the appellants, Orthodox Jewish residents of a co-operatively 
owned building, gave them a legal right to build succahs, or temporary 
shelters, on their balconies during the Jewish holiday of Succot. Con-
struction on the balconies was prohibited by the terms of co-ownership. 
The evidence presented by two rabbis at trial did not establish that Jew-
ish religious doctrine required each resident to build a personal succah. 
The trial judge, and a majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal, conclud-
ed that the claimants’ freedom of religion had not been violated because 
they had failed to establish that the practice at issue was required by 
official religious teachings. 
On appeal, Iacobucci J., writing for a 5-4 majority,
87
 held that the 
appellants’ religious freedom did entitle them to build succahs on their 
balconies, that they had not waived their rights, and that no sufficiently 
compelling competing interests existed that could justify limiting their 
rights.  Because the dispute involved private parties, it fell to be re-
solved according to the requirements imposed by the guarantee of free-
dom of religion in the Quebec human rights legislation, the Quebec 
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.
88
 The Canadian Charter did 
not apply. Nevertheless, Iacobucci J. stated that his analysis of the scope 
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 holding that religious freedom was 
not violated since it was not a requirement of the Jewish faith that the 
appellants build their own succahs. Even if the appellants were required 
by a precept of their religious faith to build succahs, Bastarache J. would 
have found the infringement of their religious freedom to be justified by 
the competing rights of other co-owners. Justice Binnie wrote a separate 
dissent finding that the appellants’ freedom of religion was reasonably 
limited on the specific facts of the case. 
The majority and dissenting judgments are remarkably different in 
their spirit and in their approach to defining the scope of religious free-
dom. The majority took an expansive view, emphasizing the public 
value of respect for and tolerance of the rights and practices of religious 
minorities. The dissenting judges took a much narrower view, portray-
ing the appellants as inflexibly insisting on questionable religious prac-
tices to the detriment of the security and comfort of their co-residents. 
Justice Iacobucci began his discussion of religious freedom by of-
fering the Court’s first attempt to define the concept of religion: 
Defined broadly, religion typically involves a particular and 
comprehensive system of faith and worship. Religion also tends to 
involve the belief in a divine, superhuman or controlling power. In 
essence, religion is about freely and deeply held personal convictions 
or beliefs connected to an individual’s spiritual faith and integrally 
linked to one’s self-definition and spiritual fulfilment, the practices of 
which allow individuals to foster a connection with the divine or with 
the subject or object of that spiritual faith.
91
 
In his view, a claimant need not show that an asserted religious be-
lief is “objectively recognized as valid by other members of the reli-
gion.”92 While a claimant may more easily establish the religious nature 
of a belief or practice if there is evidence that it corresponds with official 
religious dogma, such evidence is not necessary.
93
 Nor should freedom of 
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religion be confined to religious obligations; the Charter also protects 
“voluntary expressions of faith.”94 In sum, in the majority’s view,  
… freedom of religion consists of the freedom to undertake practices 
and harbour beliefs, having a nexus with religion, in which an 
individual demonstrates he or she sincerely believes or is sincerely 
undertaking in order to connect with the divine or as a function of his 
or her spiritual faith, irrespective of whether a particular practice or 
belief is required by official religious dogma or is in conformity with 
the position of religious officials.
95
 
Inquiries into the sincerity of an individual’s asserted religious be-
liefs should be as limited as possible: 
… the court’s role in assessing sincerity is intended only to ensure that 
a presently asserted religious belief is in good faith, neither fictitious 
nor capricious, and that it is not an artifice. Otherwise, nothing short of 
a religious inquisition would be required to decipher the innermost 
beliefs of human beings.
96
 
Justice Iacobucci offered two reasons in support of this broad con-
ception of religious freedom. First, it was consistent with the emphasis 
on “personal choice of religious beliefs” in the jurisprudence.97 Second, 
the courts should not restrict religious beliefs to officially supported 
dogma because they would then be dragged into adjudicating religious 
doctrine, a domain forbidden by the requirements of state neutrality: 
… the State is in no position to be, nor should it become, the arbiter of 
religious dogma. Accordingly, courts should avoid judicially 
interpreting and thus determining, either explicitly or implicitly, the 
content of a subjective understanding of religious requirement, 
“obligation,” precept, “commandment,” custom or ritual. Secular 
judicial determinations of theological or religious disputes, or of 
contentious matters of religious doctrine, unjustifiably entangle the 
court in the affairs of religion.
98
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While it is certainly an advantage of this approach that it limits the 
need to entangle the courts in disputes about religious doctrine, it is 
doubtful that the problem can be entirely avoided. Without any demon-
strated religious connection apart from the claimant’s asserted sincere 
belief, is it possible to determine when personal opinions become “reli-
gious”? Do religious beliefs and practices not inevitably involve some 
connection with a religious history and community?
99
 Even Iacobucci 
J.’s definition requires “a nexus with religion,” an element he asserted 
but did not discuss in this case, presumably because, as Binnie J. noted, 
the appellants’ claim so clearly related to their understanding of Jewish 
requirements during Succot.
100
 In less clear cases, establishing “a nexus 
with religion” may inevitably involve the courts in at least some general 
assessment of the presence or absence of objectively verifiable religious 
doctrine. 
In Bastarache J.’s dissenting opinion, the majority’s approach did 
not adequately distinguish between “genuine religious beliefs and per-
sonal choices or practices that are unrelated to freedom of con-
science.”101 To take adequate account of the fact that religious freedom 
has “genuine social significance and involves a relationship with oth-
ers,”102 religious beliefs must be connected to religious precepts, a body 
of objectively identifiable data.  
While one can readily agree with Bastarache J. on the importance of 
recognizing the collective aspects of religious observance, it is not clear 
why this requires the exclusion of matters of purely individual con-
science.
103
 Justice Bastarache’s opinion uses the language of religion 
and conscience interchangeably. This, coupled with his insistence on 
maintaining a clear boundary between the religious and the secular, 
leads one to wonder whether he would accord any independent signifi-
cance to section 2(a)’s protection of freedom of conscience. 
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The second way in which Bastarache J.’s view differed from the 
majority is that he held that a claimant must demonstrate a sincere belief 
that the practice dependent on the religious precept is mandatory. In his 
view, religious practices that are voluntary in nature are not protected.
104
  
His insistence on limiting protection to objectively verifiable reli-
gious precepts sincerely thought to be mandatory led Bastarache J. to a 
different conclusion than the majority. Justice Iacobucci found that the 
appellants’ freedom of religion had been violated because they held 
sincere beliefs that constructing and dwelling in their own succahs had 
religious significance to them. Justice Bastarache, on the other hand, 
was not persuaded that the appellants sincerely believed, based on an 
objectively established precept of their religion, that they were under an 
obligation to erect their own succahs.
105
 In his dissenting view, their 
sincere religious preference was not a mandatory religious practice and 
therefore their religious freedom had not been violated. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The three 2004 Supreme Court rulings canvassed above made sig-
nificant contributions to our understanding of the nature of religious 
freedom and the state’s duty of religious neutrality.  
While the majority in Lafontaine avoided the religious freedom is-
sue, LeBel J.’s dissent introduced the language of religious neutrality 
into the Court’s jurisprudence and his thoughtful discussion of its impli-
cations ought to contribute to future debates. Moreover, his opinion 
affirmed the existence of positive state duties to accommodate religious 
worship. On the other hand, some of his comments relied on a question-
able understanding of religious neutrality that might deter governments 
from undertaking steps to facilitate the exercise of religious freedoms in 
the future. The notion that governments are entitled, indeed should be 
encouraged, to engage in even-handed support of religion, is not yet 
strongly rooted in the jurisprudence.  
The Court’s opinion in the Same-Sex Marriage Reference was 
commendable for so clearly stating that religious freedom is in no way 
threatened by the federal government’s Proposed Act (subsequently 
introduced in Parliament in slightly altered form as Bill C-38). The 
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move from a definition of civil marriage rooted in Christendom to one 
aimed at fulfilling the secular ideals of the Charter is consistent with the 
state’s duty of religious neutrality, and the Court’s opinion played a 
valuable role in removing any legal objections to its attainment.  
Justice Iacobucci’s opinion for the majority in Amselem is the 
Court’s most ambitious contribution to the jurisprudence on freedom of 
religion since the Big M ruling. The majority broadly defined freedom 
of religion as embracing sincerely held subjective beliefs having a nexus 
with religion, regardless of whether those beliefs are supported by ob-
jective evidence of corresponding religious dogma. His emphasis on 
personal choice may pave the way for the development of an equally 
broad conception of freedom of conscience in the future. His opinion 
contains a strong endorsement of the idea that the courts should avoid as 
much as possible becoming arbiters of religious doctrine, another posi-
tive development from the point of view of state religious neutrality.  
Justice Iacobucci’s ruling in Amselem may become a leading case 
on Canadian constitutional understandings of religious freedom. How-
ever, the Court in Amselem was sharply divided. Justice Iacobucci’s 
broad conception of when beliefs and practices qualify as religious was 
strongly resisted in Bastarache J.’s dissent. In his separate dissent, 
Binnie J. noted that the majority’s ruling results in a “right of immense 
potential scope” that, in his view, too easily prevailed over other com-
peting rights and interests in the private context in which it arose.
106
 A 
future majority of the Court may question Iacobucci J.’s contention that 
his broad definition of religious freedom should be equally applicable to 
the constitutional guarantee in the Charter, where it is subject only to 
reasonable limits that can be demonstrably justified by governments 
pursuant to section 1.  
The Court was divided 5-4 in Amselem and Lafontaine, and the 
judges may have achieved unanimity in the Same-Sex Marriage Refer-
ence by deferring a number of difficult issues for future elucidation. No 
doubt in the years ahead we will continue to witness divisions on the 
appropriate scope of religious freedoms and state duties of religious 
neutrality. With two members of the Amselem majority (Arbour and 
Iacobucci JJ.) no longer on the Court, the Court may not adopt as gener-
ous an approach to religious freedom in forthcoming rulings as it did in 
2004.  
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